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1 Introduction
Understanding the determinants of economic inequality is important for many ques-
tions in economics. It bears directly on issues as wide ranging as education policy,
economic growth and the equity premium puzzle. Most existing work has focused on
inequality in income, wealth and a variety of individual-specic characteristics such
as educational attainment and labor market status. Relatively little attention has
been paid to inequality in what these items ultimately lead to: consumption. This is
unfortunate. The reason, presumably, that income and wealth inequality are of such
interest is that they have an important impact on consumption inequality and, as a
result, on inequality in economic welfare.
The basic question this paper asks is how important idiosyncratic income shocks
are for understanding consumption inequality. To answer this, we follow an approach
similar to Deaton and Paxson (1994). We rst present evidence on consumption and
earnings from U.S. panel data and then examine the implications for theory. The
model we use is a general equilibrium life-cycle model with imperfect risk sharing.
Our main nding is that idiosyncratic shocks are important: without them our model
cannot account for the joint behavior of U.S. data on consumption and earnings
inequality. This then leads to a number of implications. First, we nd that an
alternative model | a life-cycle version of the permanent income hypothesis | cannot
account for the data. Data on inequality, therefore, add to the existing evidence in
support of a precautionary savings motive. Second, a key ingredient is persistence. To
account for consumption inequality, we nd that idiosyncratic shocks must contain a
persistent component, with an autocorrelation coeÆcient exceeding 0.75. To account
for both consumption and earnings inequality, the autocorrelation must exceed 0.98.
Finally, and most importantly, we use our model to attribute cross-sectional variation
in lifetime consumption, earnings and welfare to either (a) characteristics determined
before age 23, or (b) shocks realized between age 23 and retirement. It is diÆcult
to understate the importance of this decomposition. Should the determinants of
inequality be xed early in life, for instance, then there is no risk-sharing role for
either nancial markets or government policies aimed at the working population such
as unemployment insurance. We argue that this is not the case, concluding that
working-age shocks account for at least 40 percent of total cross-sectional variation.
This stands in contrast to recent work by Keane and Wolpin (1997), who nd a value
closer to 10 percent.
Most of our conclusions are driven by three simple features of U.S. data: (a)
age-dependent inequality in labor earnings and consumption increases substantially
between ages 23 and 60, (b) the increase in consumption is less than the increase in
earnings, and (c) the increase in both is approximately linear. For labor earnings,
we document these facts using household-level data from the Panel Study on Income
Dynamics (PSID). For consumption, we cite evidence from Deaton and Paxson (1994),
who use Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) data. They also document these
patterns in CEX labor earnings, so the facts on earnings are representative of two
independent data sources.
The way in which we interpret these stylized facts lies at the heart of our results.
We interpret the increase in inequality with age as arising from idiosyncratic labor
market shocks which are imperfectly pooled across agents due to incomplete asset
markets. There are of course alternative interpretations, but we argue that a fair-
ly broad array of evidence supports ours. For example, we show that the pattern
in PSID earnings inequality remains if one conditions on educational cohorts. This
casts some doubt on an interpretation based upon predetermined heterogeneity in
skills. In a related paper (Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2000)) we make a similar
point, using data on inequality in hours-worked to argue against a model where con-
sumption inequality arises under complete risk sharing, driven by skill heterogeneity
and non-separability between leisure and consumption. Finally, we argue that while
there are many potential explanations of the earnings data which do not involve id-
iosyncratic risk, they are unlikely to be consistent with with increasing inequality in
consumption. The simple reason is that consumption smoothing behavior tends to
distribute deterministic sources of inequality evenly over the life cycle, resulting in a
at age prole.
Given this interpretation of what drives inequality, our model places restrictions
on risk sharing behavior, consumption decisions and the specics of the process gov-
erning idiosyncratic risk. Specically, equilibrium conditions pin down the capital to
output ratio and, since trading in capital is the means with which agents self-insure,
the amount of risk sharing which is feasible. This in turn determines the pattern
of consumption inequality, both the overall level and the dierences across ages. By
comparing this to the data, a number of insights emerge. For instance, our model does
a good job, quantitatively, at accounting for observed consumption inequality. This
lends support to papers such as Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotliko (1991), Attanasio and
Davis (1996), Attanasio and Weber (1992), Cochrane (1991) and Mace (1991), which
argue that risk sharing, especially for high frequency shocks, is considerable but far
from complete. We also nd support for the theory of precautionary savings by show-
ing that, absent the precautionary motive, consumption inequality in our model is far
in excess of that in the data. Finally, by experimenting with the idiosyncratic risk
process, we are able to rule out certain parts of the parameter space. For instance,
we are able to place a lower bound on the persistence and the volatility of idiosyn-
cratic shocks, with values below these bounds being incapable of accounting for the
increase in consumption inequality. Theory, then, in conjunction with evidence on
consumption, places restrictions on the stochastic process for earnings.
Theory also inuences how we approach our econometric analysis. Our approach
is somewhat non-standard in that we interpret data as arising from nite stochastic
processes and make strong assumptions about initial conditions. The lynchpin is
the ability to condition on age. We formulate moments based on nite sequences
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of random variables and, as a result, obtain estimators which are not subject to the
well-known problems associated with non-stationary time series processes. Based only
on age-dependent cross-sectional variances, we use PSID data to obtain an estimate
of the autocorrelation coeÆcient of idiosyncratic shocks of essentially unity. The
driving factor is the linear shape of the empirical age prole, less than unit-root shocks
being associated with a concave shape. When we add more conventional moments
to our system | autocovariances | we obtain only slightly lower estimates, in the
neighborhood of 0.98. Cross-sectional variances, therefore, seem quite informative.
Further details regarding related work are as follows. Blundell and Preston (1998),
Cutler and Katz (1992), Krueger and Perri (2000) and Slesnick (1993) also examine
how income and consumption inequality interact, but they focus on changes over
time as opposed to age. Smith and Wang (2000) show that increasing consumption
inequality with age is an important aspect of how dynamic contracting works towards
mitigating adverse eects of private information. Deaton, Gourinchas, and Paxson
(2000) explore how risk sharing via a social security system is related to consumption
inequality, something we also examine in Section 5 but in far less detail. Finally,
a rich literature | including Aiyagari (1994), Chatterjee (1994), Huggett (1996),
Quadrini (2000), Krusell and Smith (1998) and Casta~neda, Daz-Gimenez, and Ros-
Rull (1998) | focuses on wealth inequality using a class of models similar to ours.
Huggett's (1996) paper is of particular interest in that he shows how a model similar
to ours can account for how wealth inequality varies over the life cycle.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents stylized
facts on labor earnings and consumption, develops a novel econometric approach and
estimates a model for idiosyncratic earnings shocks. Section 3 outlines our life-cycle
model, Section 4 reports quantitative results, Section 5 conducts a sensitivity analysis
and Section 6 concludes.
2 Evidence
The focal point of our paper is the mapping between agent-specic labor income and
consumption. Accordingly, we begin by documenting a selected set of characteristics
of these variables pertaining to U.S. households. For labor income (and other types of
non-wage income) we obtain data from the Panel Study on Income Dynamics (PSID)
for the years 1969-1992. For consumption we exploit information from Deaton and
Paxson (1994), who obtain data from the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX)
for the years 1980-1990. The reasons for not using a single data source for both income
and consumption are related to data quality. The PSID is, arguably, the highest
quality source for income-related data, but is very narrow in terms of consumption,
being limited to the the consumption of food. The CEX, in contrast, provides data on
a broad set of consumption categories but is inferior to the PSID in terms of income.
Our approach | merging the two datasets | comes at a cost in terms of consistency,
3
but, we believe, ultimately provides a clearer picture than would either dataset in
isolation. In Appendix A we elaborate further, and also discuss the extent to which
inconsistencies between the two data sources can be reconciled.
A brief overview of the salient features of our data is as follows. The consumption
data from Deaton and Paxson (1994) corresponds to nonmedical and nondurable
expenditures on goods and services by urban households over the years 1980-1990.
We refer the reader to Deaton and Paxson (1994) for further details. Labor market and
other income|what we will refer to as `earnings' | is from the PSID and corresponds
to total household wage income, before taxes, plus `transfers' such as unemployment
insurance, workers compensation, transfers from nonhousehold family members, and
so on (an exact denition is provided in Appendix A). Transfers are included so
that our measure of earnings risk is net of the risks which are pooled through these
mechanisms, such mechanisms being absent from our theory. Our selection criteria
does not focus exclusively on male-headed households, something which distinguishes
it from many previous PSID-related studies, including our own (Storesletten, Telmer,
and Yaron (1999a)). In addition, we explicitly allow for within-sample changes in
family structure such as marriage, divorce and death. This broader-based sampling
criteria | motivated in part to be consistent with CEX consumption data | is
more comprehensive in terms of measuring idiosyncratic shocks (e.g., divorce), while
still allowing for the identication of time series parameters. The cost, of course, is
increased sensitivity to measurement error, something we argue is mitigated by our
focus on cross-sectional properties of the data.
In the upper panel of Figure 1 we report sample moments for what will be the
focus of our theoretical explorations: the age-dependent cross-sectional variance of
the logarithm of earnings and consumption. An important aspect of each of these
loci is that they explicitly control for `cohort eects' in the cross-sectional variance.
Specically, if we dene an `age-time cohort' to be all households with a head of
a given age, born in the same year, then our measures of cross-sectional dispersion
are net of dispersion which is unique to a given cohort. For instance, if dispersion
among young households in the 1982 cohort was uncharacteristically high, then we
identify the incremental amount of dispersion as a `cohort eect' and remove it using
methods outlined in Appendix A. These cohort eects turn out to be quantitatively
important, something which Deaton and Paxson (1994) also document for CEX data.
By not removing them, for instance, our estimate of the cross-sectional variance for
the young (old) increases (decreases) by roughly 50 percent (20 percent), thereby
making for a substantially atter age prole. Furthermore, in Storesletten, Telmer,
and Yaron (1999a), where we postulate an explicit model of cohort eects in volatility
(driven by idiosyncratic shocks becoming more volatile during aggregate downturns),
we nd strong evidence of that such eects are an important feature of PSID data.
Disentangling cohort and age eects, therefore, is an important ingredient of this
paper, which abstracts from both aggregate shocks and cohort eects.
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The important features of Figure 1, for our purposes, are as follows. Both earn-
ings inequality and consumption inequality increase over the working part of life cycle,
however only in the case of earnings does it decline at retirement. Inequality among
the young is roughly the same for earnings and consumption, but earnings inequality
increases at a substantially larger rate as agents age. For example, over the work-
ing years the cross-sectional standard deviation of earnings increases by roughly 80
percent, whereas that of consumption increases by only 40 percent. Finally, the rate
of increase for both earnings and consumption is, loosely speaking, linear up until
the retirement years. Each of these features, which are qualitatively similar to what
Deaton and Paxson (1994) nd using only CEX data (see their Figure 6), will be in-
formative for our theoretical explorations. The shapes of the age-inequality proles,
for instance, provide stark restrictions on the parametric model of earnings uncertain-
ty we formulate below. The location of consumption prole relative to the income
prole is informative for issues related to risk sharing and how risk is distributed over
the life cycle.
A theme of our paper is that we interpret the evidence in Figure 1 | a posi-
tive relationship between inequality and age | as indicating that households receive
persistent idiosyncratic earnings shocks throughout their working lives. Moreover,
because consumption inequality increases alongside earnings inequality, we interpret
the data as being indicative of incomplete risk sharing. There are, however, alter-
native interpretations which have very dierent economic implications. For example,
as Deaton and Paxson (1994) and others have noted, heterogeneity in skills along
with non-separability between leisure and consumption can, in a complete markets
world, generate consumption inequality which increases with age. In a related paper
(Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2000)), we use data on hours worked, consumption
and earnings to argue that this is an unlikely explanation. A second alternative, relat-
ing more directly to the pattern in earnings inequality, also involves heterogeneity in
skills. Suppose that wages grow faster for high skilled workers relative to low skilled
workers. Suppose also that, contrary to our interpretation, most of the idiosyncratic
risk which individuals face either relates to the acquisition of skills or to the return
to acquiring those skills. In this case, | if idiosyncratic risk within skill cohorts is
relatively unimportant | one would expect to see increasing inequality across the en-
tire population, but not across households with similar skill levels. In the lower panel
of Figure 1 we show that, for our PSID earnings data, this is not the case. We use
educational attainment as a proxy for skills. We see that earnings inequality increas-
es at the same rate for households with heads who have not received a high school
diploma, who have received a high school diploma and who have received a college
degree. Loosely speaking, the lower panel of Figure 1 shows that the overall measure
of earnings inequality in the upper panel is not misleading in terms of how earnings
inequality changes within education cohorts. We nd this encouraging in terms of
our interpretation of the data. We also use this as justication for pooling together
educational cohorts for the remainder of the paper, something which is convenient
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given that our model abstracts from educational choice and (explicit) heterogeneity
in skills.
2.1 A Parametric Model for Earnings
There are three features of Figure 1 which are particularly important for our analysis:
the level of inequality among the young, the increase in inequality with age and the
rate of change of this increase with age. The level will identify the relative importance
of `xed eects:' characteristics determined at birth and carried throughout life. The
increase | a factor of three between ages 23 and 60 | will identify the conditional
variance of the idiosyncratic shocks which are received over the working part of the
life cycle. Finally, the (roughly) linear rate at which inequality increases with age
will identify how persistent these shocks are. We now turn to a parametric model of
earnings uncertainty in order to tie these three features together in a coherent manner.
What follows is a relatively brief, informal treatment, with additional details relegated
to Appendix A.
We associate an individual household with the age of the household head, denoted
h, and the cohort (i.e., the birth year) to which the household belongs, denoted c.
Denoting the natural logarithm of earnings for the ith household of age h, belonging
to cohort c, as y
c
ih
, we follow Deaton and Paxson (1994) in decomposing the cross-
sectional variance of earnings into cohort and age eects, a
c
and b
h
, respectively:
Var(y
c
ih
) = a
c
+ b
h
: (1)
The age eects b
h
are, in fact, what are plotted in Figure 1 (after being additively
scaled so as to match the overall level of dispersion in the raw data). They will also
be the focal point of our theory. The cohort eects a
c
play no role in our theory
(it abstracts from aggregate variability) but, as we've argued above, represent an
important source of variability in the data. Our statistical approach, therefore, retains
Deaton and Paxson's (1994) relatively high dimensional representation of the cohort
eects (i.e., one parameter a
c
for each cohort c), but reduces the dimensionality of
the age eects to four parameters. More specically, we think of variation in y
c
ih
as
arising from two independent sources, one common to all agents of a given cohort and
the other idiosyncratic with respect to each individual agent:
y
c
ih
= x
c
+ u
ih
;
where x
c
is a cohort specic shock and u
ih
is specic to the ith individual of age h
(we omit the cohort superscript from u
ih
because its distribution does not vary across
cohorts). The process for u
ih
is
u
ih
= 
i
+ z
ih
+ "
ih
(2)
z
ih
= z
i;h 1
+ 
ih
;
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where 
i
 N(0; 
2

), "
ih
 N(0; 
2
"
), 
ih
 N(0; 
2

), z
i0
= 0 and, therefore, E(u
ih
) = 0
in the cross section. The random variable 
i
| commonly called a `xed eect' |
is realized at birth and then retained throughout life. The variables z
ih
and "
ih
are
realized at each period over the life cycle and are what we refer to as persistent and
transitory `life-cycle shocks,' respectively. Empirically, the latter is important for
capturing actual transitory shocks as well as i.i.d. measurement error, a particu-
lar concern for us given our relatively broad PSID selection criteria. Theoretically,
because most transitory risk get pooled in our model, "
ih
only matters insofar as
it aects our estimate of 

. In this sense, the quantitative features of our theo-
ry are unaected by our inability to distinguish between which component of "
ih
is
measurement error and which component is a transitory shock.
Equation (2) gives rise to the following interpretation of the age eects, b
h
, in
equation (1).
b
h
= Var(u
ih
) = 
2

+ 
2

h 1
X
j=0

2j
+ 
2
"
: (3)
Moments related to equation (3) form the foundation of our estimators and represent
a hallmark of our statistical approach. The idea is to interpret household-level data
as arising from a class of nite processes and make strong assumptions about initial
conditions. The resulting interaction between age and persistence can have important
quantitative implications. For instance, the summation term in equation (3) is the
nite analog of the familiar expression for the unconditional variance of a rst-order
autoregression: 
2

=(1   
2
). For small values of h coupled with large values of ,
these two quantities are quite dierent and, as we'll see shortly, can lead to drastically
dierent estimates. This approach has its drawbacks (mainly associated with initial
conditions) but also its benets. The interface with our OLG theory, for instance, is
seamless. Statistically, the well-known problems associated with non-stationary time
series analysis are absent since our framework is well dened for values of  greater
than or equal to unity.
2.2 Implications of Cross-Sectional Variances
Before proceeding to formal estimation, it is informative to highlight the implications
of the age-related variation in the cross-sectional variance documented in Figure 1.
Specically, we can exploit the manner in which the population variances in equation
(3) change with age, h, in order to identify three of the four parameters of interest.
There are many ways to do this, but the most natural is as follows. The amount of
initial dispersion in the data, a variance of 0.29, identies the sum 
2

+ 
2
"
(these
two parameters are not separately identied using only variances). The rate at which
dispersion increases on average | i.e., the rst derivative | identies the conditional
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variance of the persistent shocks, 
2

. Finally, the curvature in the earnings locus |
i.e., the second derivative | identies the autocorrelation, .
This algorithm is impressionistic (things are more simultaneous than it suggests),
but it captures the essence of what is easily implemented on the computer. Specif-
ically, given a value for 
2

+ 
2
"
, values for 
2

and  can be found to match the
values b
h
in equation (3) with the corresponding PSID sample moments from Figure
1. The result is depicted in Figure 2, where we plot both the PSID earnings prole
and the population moments from equation (3). The associated parameter values are

2

+ 
2
"
= 0:2735, 
2

= 0:0166 and  = 0:9989. We nd these values to be robust to
alternative algorithms, including visually matching the age proles, using an exact-
ly identied objective function, and using an overidentied objective function (i.e.,
using more than three points from the PSID age prole to select 3 parameters from
equation (3)).
At this informal level, then, the data suggest that idiosyncratic earnings shocks
contain a component which is highly persistent, perhaps permanent. The conditional
magnitude of this component is dwarfed by that of the xed eects but, as we show
below in section 2.4, its magnitude is substantial when viewed in terms of its impact
on lifetime earnings as a whole. What drives these ndings, in particular the near unit
root, is straightforward. They are an inescapable implication of viewing the linearly
increasing earnings prole in Figure 2 through the window of the age-dependent
autoregressive process represented in equations (2) and (3). Given this particular
process, a linear increase in dispersion can only be consistent with  = 1.
2.3 GMM Estimation
Estimates based on Figure 2 alone are useful in that the mapping between moments
and parameters is very transparent. The limitations, however, are that we are unable
to separately identify 

and 
"
and, just as importantly, that we may be ignoring
other important aspects of the data. Most obvious are autocovariances; we have
estimated a dynamic parameter, , without using any (explicit) dynamic information
on individual households. We now turn to a more formal GMM-based approach in
order to rectify this and ask to what extent exclusively focusing on Figure 2 distorts
our view of the data.
In order to maintain an understanding of which moments are most informative
for which parameters, we incorporate additional information in a cumulative fashion,
beginning with an exactly identied system and ending with an overidentied one.
An exactly identied system requires us to add one additional moment to the three
cross-sectional variances we've used above. The moment we add is the cross-sectional
variance of the summation of three time series observations on individual-specic
earnings. Specically, dene s
c
ih
as the summation of an h year old individual's
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earnings over three adjacent years. Given equations (1) and (2), the variance of this
sum is:
Var(s
c
ih
) = Var(y
c
ih
+ y
c
i;h+1
+ y
c
i;h+2
) (4)
= 9
2

+ 3
2
"
+

(1 + )
2
+ 1


2

+

1 + + 
2

2
Var(z
ih
) + 9a
c
where Var(z
ih
) = 
2

P
h 1
j=0

2j
. The usefulness of the summation is apparent if one
considers the variance of each component of the sum:
Var(y
c
ih
) = 
2

+ 
2
"
+Var(z
ih
) + a
c
In equation (4), the coeÆcient of 9 multiplying 
2

, versus that of 3 multiplying 
2
"
,
is what identies 
"
and 

. It reects the fact that three independent realizations
of "
ih
occur over adjacent years, whereas 
i
is only realized once. While the same
information is contained in the autocovariances, Cov(y
c
ih
; y
c
i;h+1
) and Cov(y
c
ih
; y
c
i;h+2
),
the summation is more useful in that we are able to incorporate information from
multiple autocovariances while still maintaining an exactly identied system.
One last transformation is required. For each age, h, the last term on the right
side of equation (4) implies that the moment is cohort-specic. Our approach |
which is to formulate an exactly identied system of four age-specic moments |
requires that we eliminate cohort specicity. For the summation moments, (4), we do
so by scaling our data on s as follows.
s
ih
=
s
c
ih
Var(s
c
ih
)
1=2

9
2

+ 3
2
"
+

(1 + )
2
+ 1


2

+

1 + + 
2

2
Var(z
ih
)

1=2
;
where we take as given the coeÆcients a
c
(obtained through a rst-pass OLS regres-
sion, as in Deaton and Paxson (1994)). The variance of s
ih
, which is now absent
cohort eects, is simply the term in parentheses.
Table 1 reports our estimates. The moments underlying the exactly identied
system are the three cross-sectional variances denoted with asterisks in Figure 2 and
the variance of s
ih
, where h = 42. In Appendix A we provide more details as well
a discussion indicating that our estimates are not sensitive to formulating moments
based on dierent ages, h. What we see is that the incorporation of autocovariances
reduces our estimate of , but only slightly. We now obtain  = 0:985 as opposed to
 = 0:998 previously. We get a slightly higher estimate of 
2

| 0.022 versus 0.017 |
and nd that the variance of the transitory shocks is roughly 23% as large as that of
the xed eect shock (
2
"
= 0:057 and 
2

= 0:242, whereas we previously found that

2
"
+ 
2

= 0:271). Overall, it appears that our informal estimates based on Figure
2 are robust to this particular means of incorporating more dynamic information
contained in the data.
In the third panel of Table 1 we carry the process one step further, specifying an
overidentied system which consists of the same three cross-sectional variances (the
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asterisks in Figure 2) but summations corresponding to all ages h (thus giving us 41
overidentifying restrictions). In other words, whereas the estimates in panel B rely
on us choosing a particular age h in order to identify each of the four parameters, we
now include moments associated with all ages and let the GMM estimator weight each
moment according to its informativeness (see Appendix A). By doing so not only do
we provide a check on age sensitivity, we also open up the possibility that less weight
is given to what drives our near-unit-root estimate of  | the linear, upward sloping
shape of the age prole of cross-sectional variance | and more weight is given to
autocovariances, the focus of much previous work which as often found substantially
smaller values for . As is seen in Table 1, panel C, our estimates are barely changed.
In particular, the estimate of  is 0.982 and the magnitude of the innovation variances
is essentially the same.
Our nal set of estimates, reported in Table 1, Panel D, relax the restriction that
the cohort eects, a
c
, are equal to those from preliminary OLS estimation. Instead,
we estimate the four parameters of our time series model simultaneously with the
cohort parameters, a
c
, thereby achieving our initial goal of a decomposition similar
to that of Deaton and Paxson (1994) but with a lower dimensional representation of
the age eects. Once again we see that our previous estimates appear to be quite
robust, the variances being essentially unchanged and the estimate of  falling to only
0.977.
The overall message at this point is that the age pattern in the cross-sectional
variances (Figure 2) is quite informative. The incorporation of autocovariances implies
smaller estimates of persistence | something we nd reassuring given previous work
| but the magnitude of the decrease is very small. Appendix A provides additional
evidence, based on more conventional moment specications, showing that as long as
cross-sectional variances of the form in equation (3) are incorporated, their implication
of very high persistence seems to be a robust feature of the data.
2.4 How is Uncertainty Distributed Over the Life Cycle?
Before moving on to our theory, it's informative to ask what our estimates suggest
about the extent to which earnings uncertainty is resolved early in life versus being
distributed throughout the life cycle. Keane and Wolpin state that
According to our estimates, unobserved endowment heterogeneity, as mea-
sured at age 16, accounts for 90 percent of the variance in lifetime utility.
Alternatively, time-varying exogenous shocks to skills account for only 10
percent of the variation. Keane and Wolpin (1997, pg. 515).
Our estimates of the relative magnitudes of the xed eects, 
i
, and the life-cycle
shocks, 
ih
and "
ih
, are informative along these lines, with xed eects representing
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`unobserved endowment heterogeneity' and life-cycle shocks represent `time varying
exogenous shocks.'
Specically, representative estimates (from Table 1) of the conditional variance of
the persistent and transitory shocks are 
2

= 0:023 and 
2
"
= 0:060, respectively. The
variance of the xed eect shock is substantially larger, at 
2

= 0:245. Comparing
these values, however, is misleading in that such a comparison ignores the eect of
persistence on the unconditional variance as well the fact that the persistent shocks
are not just realized once | as is the case for the xed eects | but at each point
along the life cycle. A more relevant comparison is the following variance ratio:
Var

P
65
h=23
R
 h
e
u
ih
j 

= 
"
= 0

Var

P
65
h=23
R
 h
e
u
ih

; (5)
where the discount rate, R, is set to 4.5 percent, an equilibrium outcome of our
model. Equation (5) is simply the variance of the discounted stream of earnings,
absent life-cycle shocks, relative to the variance inclusive of life-cycle shocks. Using
the above values, with the conservative choice of 
"
= 0 (i.e., the transitory shocks
are interpreted as measurement error), we compute this ratio to be 58 percent. If we
incorporate a realistic life cycle pattern in the mean of earnings | described explicitly
in the next section | we nd the ratio to be slightly lower, at 54 percent. In either
case, our results stand somewhat in contrast to those of Keane and Wolpin (1997).
While we nd, as they do, that a majority of a household's earnings risk is realized
early in life, we dier substantially in terms of the magnitude. Their estimates suggest
that just 10 percent of the uncertainty is attributable to life-cycle shocks whereas our
estimate is roughly 46 percent.
An obvious limitation of these results is that they are based on the simple statis-
tical model in equation (2) as opposed to the rich model of occupational choice which
Keane and Wolpin (1997) advocate. They are also based exclusively on earnings data
and ignore the implications of how U.S. consumption inequality changes with age (see
Figure 1). We therefore revisit this issue after describing our theory, which imposes
strong restrictions on the joint distribution of earnings and consumption. What we'll
see is that while the quantitative message does not change dramatically, the evidence
supportive of this message is strengthened.
3 Theory
We now formulate a stationary life cycle model in order to ask how the earnings
inequality described above might manifest itself in terms of consumption inequality.
The model will deliver restrictions on U.S. consumption inequality which are informa-
tive for the model itself as well as the class of earnings processes which, when viewed
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through the window of the model, are consistent with data on consumption. Our the-
ory has its roots in the Bewley (1986) class of models, building on previous studies by
Huggett (1996),
_
Imrohoroglu,
_
Imrohoroglu, and Joines (1995) and Ros-Rull (1994),
as well as subsequent work in Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (1999a).
The economy is populated by H overlapping generations of agents, each generation
consisting of a large number of atomistic agents. Agents are indexed by age, h,
with h 2 H = f1; 2; : : : ;Hg. Lifetimes are uncertain. We use 
h
to denote the
unconditional probability of surviving up to age h, with 
1
= 1, and use 
h
= 
h
=
h 1
,
h = 2; 3; : : : ;H, to denote the probability of surviving up to age h, conditional on
being alive at age h  1. The fraction of the total population attributable to each age
cohort is xed over time at '
h
and the population grows at rate #.
Each individual agent is characterized by their age, a preference ordering over
consumption distributions, an endowment process and an asset market position. Pref-
erences for an unborn agent are identical across agents and are represented by,
E
H
X
h=1

h

h
U(c
h
) ; (6)
where U is the standard twice dierentiable, strictly concave utility function and the
expectation is taken with respect to the economy's stationary probability distribution.
Agents begin working at age 22 and, conditional on surviving, retire at age 65.
After retirement they must nance consumption entirely from an existing stock of
assets. Prior to retirement an agent of age h receives an annual endowment, n
h
, of
an age-specic amount of labor hours (or, equivalently, productive eÆciency units)
which they supply inelastically to an aggregate production technology. Individual
labor income is then determined as the product of hours worked and the market
clearing wage rate.
Aside from age, heterogeneity is driven by idiosyncratic labor market uncertainty.
We adopt the following process for the logarithm of hours worked,
logn
h
= 
h
+ + z
h
+ "
h
; (7)
where 
h
are a set of parameters used to characterize the cross-sectional distribution
of mean income across age cohorts,   N(0; 
2

) is a `xed eect,' determined at
birth, "
h
 N(0; 
2
"
) is a transitory shock received each period, and z
h
is a persistent
shock, also received each period, which follows a rst-order autoregression:
z
h
= z
h 1
+ 
h
; 
h
 N(0; 
2

) ; z
0
= 0 :
This process is a direct analog of what we estimated in the previous section, the
only dierence being that, here, we specify a process for hours worked and not labor
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earnings. The dierence, however, will be an additive constant (the wage rate in our
stationary equilibrium will be constant), thereby making the distinction innocuous.
Output in this world is produced by an aggregate technology to which individuals
rent their labor services and capital. Denoting per-capita output as Y , the production
technology is of the form
Y = Zf(K;N) ;
where K and N denote per-capita capital and labor supply, respectively, and Z is a
constant which governs secular growth. We appeal to a cross-sectional law of large
numbers to argue thatK and N are constants and normalizeN to unity. The compet-
itively determined wage and capital rental rates are denoted W and R, respectively.
Denoting aggregate consumption as C, and given a rate of depreciation on aggregate
capital of Æ, the law of motion for aggregate capital is
K
0
= Y   C + (1  Æ)K :
There is one asset { capital { which pays a return R in addition to a survivor's
premium which we use to represent an actuarily fair annuity. Specically, the total
return on capital invested at age h   1, conditional on surviving to age h, is R=
h
(recall that 
h
is the conditional survival probability). Agents who do not survive to
age h receive zero return and their assets are, eectively, redistributed throughout
the surviving population.
Dynamic Programming Problem and Equilibrium
The cross-sectional distribution for this economy can now be represented as a function
, dened over an appropriate family of subsets of S = (H 
~
Z  A), where
~
Z
is the product space containing all possible idiosyncratic shocks and A is the set
of possible capital holdings. In words,  is simply a distribution of agents across
ages, idiosyncratic shocks, and asset holdings. Because our economy does not feature
aggregate shocks, we can appeal to cross-sectional law of large numbers to ensure
that, in any stationary equilibrium, the distribution  is unique (Aiyagari (1994)).
Recalling that R and W denote the (market clearing) return on capital and the
wage rate, respectively, the decisions of an agent of age h are governed by the following
constraints.
c
h
+ a
0
h+1
 a
h
R=
h
+ n
h
W (8)
a
0
h+1
 a(; z) ; a
H+1
 0 ;
where a
h
denotes beginning of period asset (or capital) holdings, a
0
h+1
denotes end
of period asset holdings, and a(; z) denotes a (possibly) state-dependent borrowing
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constraint. Our timing convention is that savings decisions are made at the end of
the current period, and returns are paid the following period at the realized capital
rental rate (adjusted by the annuity factor, 
h
).
Denoting the value function of an h year old agent as V
h
, their choice problem
can be represented as,
V
h
(; z
h
; "
h
; a
h
) = max
a
0
h+1

U(c
h
) + 

h+1

h
E

V
0
h+1
(; z
0
h+1
; "
0
h+1
; a
0
h+1
)


(9)
subject to equations (8).
An equilibrium is dened as prices, R and W and a set of cohort-specic functions,
fV
h
; a
0
h+1
g
H
h=1
such that (a) the rm's prot maximization problem is satised (R =
Zf
1
(K;N)   Æ + 1 and W = Zf
2
(K;N)), (b) individual optimization problems are
satised (fV
h
; a
0
h+1
g
H
h=1
satisfy equations (9)), and (c) markets clear and aggregate
quantities result from individual decisions (K =
R
S
a
h
d and N =
R
S
n
h
d).
We solve the individuals' optimization problems based on piecewise linear ap-
proximation of the decision rules, and follow Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari (1994) in
solving for the equilibrium interest rate.
4 Quantitative Results
We interpret one period in our model as corresponding to one year of calendar time.
The aggregate production technology is Cobb-Douglas:
Y = ZK

N
1 
;
Following Cooley and Prescott (1995), we set  equal to 0.4 (which corresponds to
capital's share of national income being 40%) and allow for a 7.8% annual depreciation
rate on the aggregate capital stock. The secular growth rate in GNP per capita, by
which we normalize all individual quantities in our model, is chosen to be 1.5% per
year.
Each agent's preferences are identical (up to age-dependent mortality risk) and
are described by equation (6). We parameterize the period utility function with the
standard isoelastic specication,
U(c) =
c
1 
  1
1  
:
We set  to 2 and the utility discount factor, , is set so as to match the average
capital to output ratio in the U.S of 2.9. This gives rise to a real return on capital, R,
of 5.99 percent. Demographic variables are chosen to correspond to simple properties
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of the U.S. population. Agents are `born' at age 22, retire at age 65 and are dead by
age 100. 'Retirement' is dened as having one's labor income drop to zero. Mortality
rates are chosen to match those of the U.S. females in 1991 and population growth is
set to 1.0%.
The process for idiosyncratic labor income, equation (7), is implemented as a
discrete approximation to the autoregressive time series model in equation (2).
1
Pa-
rameter values are chosen to correspond to our point estimates in Table 1 Panel A,
except that we choose  = 1 instead of  = 0:9989. The choice of a unit root speci-
cation is motivated by several factors. First, it allows us to exploit a normalization
which greatly reduces our computational burden.
2
Second, unit root economies facili-
tate a useful comparison with other theories of consumption choice, most notably the
life cycle version of the permanent income hypothesis. Third, much of the focus of our
quantitative questions is on the age prole of the cross-sectional variance of earnings
and consumption. Economies with  < 1 will, in general, overstate the degree of
curvature in the earnings locus, thereby making for a more diÆcult interpretation of
what drives dierences in theoretical and empirical consumption proles. A unit root,
on the other hand, matches the theoretical and empirical earnings proles, allowing
us to look elsewhere for what drives dierences in consumption. Finally, in Section 5
we demonstrate that the implications of using  = 1 instead of  = :98 (i.e., values
from Table 1, Panels B-D) are of minor importance for consumption behavior. Our
results, therefore, are equally valid for near-unit-root shocks | values of  between
0.98 and 1.00 | as they are for unit-root shocks.
One nal parameter is the the lower bound on asset holdings or, equivalently, the
borrowing constraint. For the case of unit root shocks (where we solve a normalized
version of our economy) the constraint is a(; z) = ae
+z
, with the constant a set
so that the average agent cannot borrow in excess of the (annual) level of GNP per
capita.
3
For economies with  < 1, a(; z) is a constant, set equal to the negative of
annual GNP per capita.
1
In the case of  = 0:98, we approximate the autoregressive process with a 21-state Markov chain,
following the approach in Huggett (1996).
2
The unit root in endowments implies that the ratio of future endowments over the exponent of the
sum of previous shocks, e
z
, is identically distributed, irrespective of e
z
. Moreover, since preferences
are homothetic and current endowments and borrowing constraints are constant fractions of e
z
, one
can show that the ratio of optimal consumption to e
z
is independent of z. Thus, one does not have
to keep track of z as a state variable, and one needs only take into account the distribution of the
innovation to the shock, which we approximate with an i.i.d., two-state Markov chain.
3
In our benchmark economy, with unit-root shocks, the borrowing constraint does not bind for
any agent in any state of nature, irrespective of a. Only for economies with  < 1 is the value of a
relevant.
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4.1 Risk Sharing
A useful context in which to interpret our results is the process for marginal utility
implied by the rst-order conditions of an unconstrained agent,
U
0
(c
h
) =
1
R
U
0
(c
h 1
) + v
h
; (10)
where v
h
 U
0
(c
h
) E[U
0
(c
h
)] is the innovation in marginal utility experienced by an
h year old agent. This innovation is, by denition, conditionally uncorrelated with
anything in the agent's information set when they were h  1 years old. Its variance,
however, can display a variety of dierent patterns. Most models with a life cycle
component, for instance, feature the variance of v
h
being age dependent.
Equation (10) is relevant for interpreting our results because the variance of v
h
is
at the heart of what we think of as risk sharing and the implications for consumption
inequality. If markets were complete, for instance, the variance of v
h
would be zero
| recall that our economy abstracts from aggregate uncertainty | and, given ho-
mothetic preferences and separability between consumption and leisure, consumption
inequality would be constant over the life cycle. Autarky, on the other hand, would
result in the variance of v
h
being closely associated with that of the innovations in
labor earnings, and the pattern of consumption inequality would be similar to the
pattern of earnings inequality we see in Figure 1. Partial risk sharing, which char-
acterizes our model, implies that the variance of v
h
lies somewhere in between, the
exact location being governed by the risk sharing technologies with which we endow
our economy.
Equation (10) also captures the sense in which the equilibrium aspect of our model
plays a fundamental role. Equilibrium conditions impose restrictions on the variance
of v
h
| and therefore restrictions on the pattern of consumption inequality | which
go beyond those obtainable by studying the rst-order condition (10) in isolation. In
simple terms, an individual who dissaves in the face of an adverse shock (or saves
less than they would otherwise) is only able to do so insofar as some other agent
saves in response to a good shock. Moreover, the set of feasible exchanges between
these agents is constrained by the nancial market structure. These constraints have a
direct bearing on risk sharing allocations and, therefore, on the variance of v
h
. In more
specic terms, our model's specication for preferences and technologies (including the
stochastic processes for labor earnings) imply a particular level of aggregate capital
which must serve as the vehicle with which agents collectively buer their idiosyncratic
shocks. In relation to equation (10), this is the same as saying that the rate of return
on savings, R, is endogenous and cannot be chosen independently of time preference,
, and the function U(). As we'll see, the interaction of these variables and their
impact on savings behavior is quantitatively important for the amount of risk sharing
which nancial markets can facilitate and, therefore, for the variance of v
h
.
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4.2 Implications of the Life Cycle/Permanent Income Hypothesis
In order to best understand our results, note that agents in our model have two
motives for saving: a life cycle motive and a precautionary motive. It is informative
to begin by abstracting from the latter. The dotted line in Figure 3 reports the
implications of the life cycle version of the permanent income hypothesis (PIH), a
framework characterized by certainty equivalence and, therefore, the absence of a
precautionary motive. More precisely, the dotted line represents the implications for
consumption inequality, should each agent face an environment identical to that in
our benchmark economy, but have quadratic preferences and a rate of time preference
equal to the benchmark rate of return on capital. What we see is that the PIH
overstates the degree of consumption inequality, both relative to the data and relative
to our benchmark economy. For our particular parameterization, the PIH predicts
that consumption inequality will exceed earnings inequality over most of the working
years. A striking and robust feature of the data is that the opposite is true.
The economics underlying the PIH graph are straightforward and can be derived
analytically.
4
Because of a life-cycle pattern in average income (which we calibrate to
U.S. data), PIH consumers hold negative nancial wealth, on average, until age 40.
That is, they borrow against future wage receipts. A crucial variable for determining
at what rate consumption inequality disperses is, for a given age, the average fraction
of total wealth which is represented by nancial wealth, where total wealth is dened
as nancial wealth plus human wealth (i.e., claims to future wage payments). If nan-
cial wealth is a large fraction of total wealth, then (persistent) idiosyncratic shocks
will have a small impact on total income, on consumption decisions, and therefore on
the cross-sectional variance of consumption. The opposite holds if nancial wealth is
small relative to total wealth. The pattern we see in the PIH line of Figure 3 reects
these eects. During the years in which the average household borrows, consumption
inequality increases at a more rapid rate than earnings inequality. Once the average
household begins to save (in order to nance retirement consumption), consumption
inequality still increases, but at slower rate relative to earnings inequality. Quanti-
tatively speaking, the degree of convexity and concavity which this gives rise to is
diÆcult to distinguish from the data. What is true, however, is that the overall level
of consumption inequality, relative to earnings inequality, is substantially larger than
what we see in the U.S. economy.
Our model, in contrast, generates a far more realistic picture. The dashed line in
Figure 3 shows that consumption inequality is everywhere less than earnings inequal-
ity, as is the case in the data. The overall increase in inequality | which is roughly
100 percent in the data | is 125 percent in our model versus over 300 percent for the
PIH. We attribute the dierences to two features of our framework: a precautionary
4
We have done so based on a generalization of the calculations in Deaton and Paxson (1994), page
457.
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savings motive and a general equilibrium restriction. The latter is that time prefer-
ence, , is chosen not to equal the rate of return on savings, as in the PIH, but to
pin down a realistic level of aggregate savings. Aggregate savings is the vehicle with
which society collectively pools risk, so this restriction is crucial for the location of the
consumption inequality prole relative to the earnings prole. The former | the pre-
cautionary savings motive | is a characteristic of our model's convex marginal utility
(Kimball (1990)) and has played an important role in accounting for data on the level
of life cycle savings (c.f., Carroll (1997), Carroll and Samwick (1998), Deaton (1992),
and Zeldes (1989)). Our results provide additional support for a precautionary mo-
tive by focusing on its importance in accounting for consumption dispersion. We nd
the stock of savings generated by a precautionary motive to be an important factor
in generating the lower level of consumption inequality relative to earnings inequality
| that is, the risk sharing behavior | which we see in the data. The key, as above,
is the ratio of nancial wealth to total wealth. With a precautionary motive, agents
begin to accumulate wealth very early in life, not even choosing to borrow against an
increasing average prole of lifetime earnings. As nancial wealth grows relative to
human wealth the impact of idiosyncratic shocks on consumption decisions, and on
consumption inequality, is mitigated.
4.3 Understanding the Benchmark Economy
Figure 3 shows that, while our economy does a better job than the PIH, it still
generates consumption inequality which is excessive relative to the data. We now
present results from computational experiments which illustrate why this is, how our
model might be modied, and what we learn about risk sharing in the real world.
The fact that risk sharing seems understated in our economy leads us to question
two sets of assumptions: those related to the statistical processes governing earnings
uncertainty and those related to the technologies with which agents share risk. We
defer the latter until Section 5 and begin with the former. There are three important
aspects of earnings uncertainty which are important for understanding our results.
A. A realistically shaped prole of earnings inequality is neither necessary nor suÆ-
cient to generate a realistically shaped prole of consumption inequality.
The importance of this is that consumption inequality does not simply reect whatever
properties we assign to earnings inequality. What matters goes deeper than that,
reecting how consumption and risk sharing respond to the statistical properties of
earnings uncertainty. To illustrate this we consider two polar cases. First we show that
we can formulate an earnings process with a cross sectional variance identical to that
in Figure 3, but which generates a strongly counterfactual pattern in consumption
inequality. Next, we do the opposite and show that there exist counterfactual earnings
processes which generate reasonable looking consumption proles.
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Each of these cases are illustrated in Figure 4. The dashed lines demonstrate in-
suÆciency. These lines represent earnings and consumption inequality in an economy
with i.i.d. earnings shocks (i.e.,  = 0) which are heteroskedastic in terms of age.
In other words, increasing earnings inequality is generated by increasing conditional
variance, as opposed to constant conditional variance in conjunction with persistence.
We see that the implications for consumption are dramatic; inequality increases by
less than 15% whereas it more than doubles in both the data and our benchmark
economy (Figure 3). Persistence is therefore crucial.
The dotted lines in Figure 4 demonstrate that the converse holds. That is, they
represent an economy in which consumption inequality is similar to what we see in
the data but earnings inequality is strongly counterfactual. Again, autocorrelation
plays an important role. The earnings process in this case has homoskedastic shocks,
but  = 0:86. What generates the at dispersion prole is that we set the variance
of the initial conditions (the variables z
i0
) equal to the variance of the the stationary
distribution of the z process. Increasing earnings inequality, then, is not necessary
for increasing consumption inequality.
From an econometric perspective, the upshot of this point is that the process
for earnings is not identied by the age prole of consumption inequality alone. It is
identied, however, by the combination of the age proles of earnings and consumption
(i.e., there are lots of earnings processes which give rise to a realistic consumption
prole, but only one which also ts the facts on earnings). This is the sense in
which our model is an eective way to discriminate between alternative processes for
earnings.
B. Highly persistent idiosyncratic shocks are necessary to account for increasing con-
sumption inequality
The necessity of persistence has already been suggested by the preceding discussion.
A stronger statement is as follows. Processes for earnings inequality with  < 0:75
cannot account for the magnitude of the increase in consumption inequality which
we see in the data. This is true, irrespective of the implications of such processes for
earnings inequality. It is also true irrespective of whether or not we allow ourselves
the exibility of letting the conditional variance function be age dependent.
These statements are based on computational experiments in which we choose a
particular value for  and then select the remaining parameter values to maximize
the increase in consumption inequality, subject to the constraint that the average
level of earnings inequality matches that of the U.S. data. In each case, a value of
 < 0:75 turns out to be insuÆcient for generating a realistic increase in consump-
tion inequality. Several examples are illustrated in Figure 5. Each theoretical line
represents consumption inequality for an economy in which the conditional variance
of the persistent shocks is chosen to match the average level of earnings inequality.
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We see lines associated with  < 0:75 are decient relative to the data. Thus, even if
we ignore the counterfactual implications for earnings inequality of  being substan-
tially less than unity (earnings inequality is far too concave in these cases), we need
a relatively large value of  in order to account for consumption.
5
C. A substantial component of overall earnings uncertainty must arise in the form of
persistent shocks, received over the life cycle.
Equivalently, the conditional variance of the persistent shocks, 

, must be of suÆ-
cient magnitude if our theory is to be consistent with the increase in consumption
inequality. While this is to a certain extent obvious, given the previous point about
the necessity of persistent shocks, it is worth emphasizing in a dierent context. As
we discussed in Section 2.4, Keane and Wolpin's (1997) work suggests that 90 percent
of the average household's lifetime earnings uncertainty is resolved at quite an early
age. Our results suggest that this may be inconsistent with the joint behavior of
earnings and consumption inequality which we see in U.S. data. More specically, we
nd that, in the context of our benchmark economy with unit-root shocks, the small-
est value of the conditional variance, 
2

, which can generate a realistic increase in
consumption inequality is 0.0154, which is only 7 percent smaller than our benchmark
value of 0.0166.
6
It is informative to view this result | the minimum volatility in the persistent
shocks which can account for the increase in U.S. consumption inequality | in the
context of the variance decomposition of Section 2.4. Using the above parameter
values,  = 1, 
2

= 0:0154, 
2

= 0:2970 and 
2
"
= 0:0041, we compute the variance
ratio in equation (5) to be 55 percent (the value from our unit-root, benchmark
economy is 51 percent). The upshot, therefore, is that stochastic life-cycle shocks
must account for at least 45 percent of the lifetime variation in labor earnings in
order to t the facts on increasing consumption inequality.
4.4 Discussion: A Puzzle and a Solution
We take several lessons from our analysis to this point. First, there seems to be a
tension between accounting for the earnings data and accounting for the consumption
data, where the battle is fought primarily in terms of the autocorrelation coeÆcient. If
5
Note that relatively small values for  also generate the counterfactual implication that earnings
inequality decreases slightly between ages 35 and 45. This is a result of an increasingly important
role played by borrowing constraints, something we discuss further in Section 5.
6
We arrive at this conclusion by lowering the magnitude of 
2

while simultaneously increasing the
size of the xed-eect shocks, 
2

, so as to maintain the same average level of earnings dispersion.
The resulting value for 
2

is 0.2970, a 9 percent increase relative to the benchmark. The value of

2

= 0:0154 is that which delivers an average increase in consumption dispersion which matches the
U.S. data.
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we restrict ourselves to shocks which are homoskedastic in terms of age, the earnings
data are strongly suggestive of a unit root. The consumption data, on the other
hand, suggest more risk sharing than our model can generate with unit-root shocks.
Consumption, therefore, seems to indicate less persistent shocks. The important
caveat is the linear shape of the consumption prole. Even with unit-root shocks, our
model generates a consumption locus which appears to be excessively concave. This
concavity is driven primarily by the same type of `portfolio eect' as was discussed
above: agents accumulate wealth as they age and, as a result, the consumption eect
of an idiosyncratic shocks diminishes with age.
A second lesson is that theory is helpful in distinguishing between alternative
statistical models for earnings uncertainty. In other words, because there are many
ways to generate a given pattern of earnings inequality, our model plays an important
role in identifying which are consistent with the evidence on consumption inequality.
A stark example is inherent in point A of the previous section. The dashed earnings
prole in Figure 4 is identical to that from our benchmark economy, but, instead of
being generated by persistent shocks, is generated by i.i.d. shocks with a conditional
variance which increases with age. This process matches the evidence on earnings but,
through the window of our model, has counterfactual implications for consumption
(the lower, dashed line in Figure 4). Our model, therefore, imposes informative
restrictions on earnings uncertainty, suggestive of the importance of persistence.
Finally, the tension related to persistence is suggestive of one of two things. Either
we loosen-up our benchmark statistical model for earnings uncertainty, or we explore
alternative risk sharing technologies in our theory. We turn to the latter in the next
section. An example of the former is that we can allow the conditional variance of
the persistent shocks to change with age, something we've already employed above in
point A. We pursue this further in Figure 6, where we show the implications of alter-
native values of , where the age-dependent heteroskedasticity in the persistent shocks
is specied so as to match the evidence on increasing earnings uncertainty. We see
that a value of  = 0:85 succeeds in accounting for both consumption and earnings
inequality. Apparently, the exibility aorded by age-dependent heteroskedasticity
resolves the tension between consumption and earnings by allowing for lower auto-
correlation | and therefore more risk sharing | while maintaining an earnings prole
which increases linearly.
How plausible is this? The key feature of the economy with heteroskedasticity (the
graph with  = 0:85 in Figure 6) is that idiosyncratic shocks become increasingly
volatile with age. We are unaware of the empirically plausibility of older workers
receiving idiosyncratic shocks which are more volatile than those faced by younger
workers.
7
What is clear, however, is that this is a strong, testable restriction implied
by our model. Moreover, it is a restriction which applies to models of consumption
choice more generally (e.g., the PIH), many of which also generate concave dispersion
7
See, however, the model and discussion of health shocks in Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1994)).
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proles due to the life-cycle pattern in wealth accumulation which we've highlighted
above. In a nutshell, linearity in both the earnings and the consumption prole,
with the latter lying beneath the former, may be diÆcult to account for without this
particular pattern of heteroskedasticity over the life cycle.
4.5 The Life Cycle Distribution of Uncertainty Revisited
In Section 2.4 we decomposed the uncertainty earnings into a component which is
realized early in life and a component which is realized along the life cycle. We
found that 46 percent of the variability in lifetime earnings is attributable to life-
cycle shocks. Our theory now allows us to revisit this question in a richer economic
context, conducting the decomposition with regard to consumption and welfare as
opposed to the exogenously-given earnings process.
We begin with a calculation which is directly comparable to that in Keane and
Wolpin (1997): a decomposition of the variability in lifetime utility. Denote realized
utility, along some random path, as w(; ; "):
w(; ; ") =
H
X
h=1

h

h
U(c
h
) :
If w is evaluated at the optimum, then the conditional mean, E(w j), is the value
function V conditional on some realized xed eect, . We denote V

= E(w j).
The total variance in realized utility can therefore be decomposed into variance at-
tributable to xed eects (i.e., variance in these conditional value functions) and the
average variance, conditional on xed eects:
Var(w) = Var(E[w j]) +E(Var [w j])
= Var(V

) +E(Var [w j]) :
Our interpretation of Keane and Wolpin (1997) is that Var(V

)=Var (w) is roughly
90 percent. For our economy, after converting w into monetary equivalents (to be
consistent with Keane and Wolpin (1997)) we nd this ratio to be 0.65. Fixed ef-
fects, therefore, account for more of the variation in lifetime utility than they do the
variation in the present value of lifetime earnings. Given that utility is dened over
consumption, and that agents are able to use nancial markets to self insure against
life-cycle shocks but not xed-eect shocks, this is not surprising.
Accounting for a majority of the variation in lifetime utility, however, does not
necessarily imply precedence in terms of welfare. A more direct decomposition of
how xed and life cycle eects impact welfare is as follows. Consider an unborn
agent. Denote  

as the percentage reduction in per-period consumption which,
when combined with receiving a xed eect shock  = 0 with certainty, would make
them indierent to living in our benchmark economy which does include xed-eect
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uncertainty. In Appendix B we show that  

= 1  exp( 
2

=2). Denote  
u
as the
analogous consumption reduction, only where we eliminate both the life-cycle shocks
and the xed-eect shocks. Appendix B also shows that  
u
can be computed up to
a scale factor which must be computed by simulation. The ratio  

= 
u
reects the
relative valuation, in percentage units of consumption, of the xed-eect shocks. Our
benchmark economy yields values of  

= 0:24,  
u
= 0:40 for a ratio of
 

 
u
= 0:60 :
Alternatively, we might express the value of eliminating the xed eects relative to
 
l
, the value of getting rid of just the life cycle shocks. We compute  
l
to be 0.22,
implying that the welfare cost of xed eects is just 9 percent larger than that of
life-cycle eects. In either case the implication is that xed eects are relatively
less important from a welfare perspective than they are in accounting for variance
in lifetime utility. The reason is related to how the life-cycle shocks aect welfare.
Agents dislike life-cycle shocks for two reasons: the variability which they represent
and the fact that they motivate the accumulation of a precautionary buer stock of
savings. The latter has a utility cost in and of itself (it generates a less at life pattern
in average consumption), thereby implying that the welfare implications of life-cycle
shocks are larger than the fraction of the variability in realized utility which they
account for.
In summary, we nd that uncertainty which is realized early in life accounts for
somewhere between 54 and 65 percent of the lifetime uncertainty which agents face.
The lower number is based on a decomposition of the variance in lifetime earnings
(Section 2.4). The higher is based on the variance in lifetime utility. To us, however,
the most natural measure of the importance of a particular source of uncertainty is
how much an agent will pay to eliminate it. By this metric, xed eects represent
roughly 60 percent of the welfare cost of total idiosyncratic risk.
These results stand in contrast to those of Keane and Wolpin (1997). We at-
tribute the dierences to two factors. They assume, for computational reasons, that
idiosyncratic shocks are i.i.d. whereas high persistence plays a central role in both
our model and our empirical analysis. They limit their attention to ages 16 through
26, whereas we consider the entire life cycle. The latter is important for our results,
which depend on the overall increase in inequality between age 23 and retirement.
5 Sensitivity Analysis
The implications of our model are robust to a number of alternative statistical pro-
cesses for earnings uncertainty and a number of alternative risk sharing arrangements.
The specics are as follows.
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(a) Stationary shocks. Most of our results have been based on an economy with
unit-root shocks. In Section 4 we justied this on several grounds, but the
fact remains that the bulk of the evidence in Section 2 and Table 1 points to
estimates of  less than unity but greater than 0.96 (incorporating the standard
errors). In Figure 7 we report results analogous to our main results (Figure
3), only where we use parameter values which are representative of those from
Table 1. We set  = 0:984 and, in order to maintain a clean comparison, keep

2

xed at its benchmark value. We then choose 
2

to match the average level
of earnings dispersion in the data. We see that the theoretical earnings locus is
now more concave than in the data, owing to a value of  less than unity, and
that consumption dispersion is slightly higher than in our benchmark economy,
Figure 3.
8
Overall, we nd that a calibration based on Panels B-D of Table 1
generates earnings inequality which is somewhat inconsistent with the data, but
consumption inequality which is quite similar to that in our benchmark economy.
The former is not surprising, given that these estimates incorporate information
far beyond that contained in the cross-sectional variances for earnings. The
latter is the sense in which our results are robust to the near-unit-root behavior
which we conclude is a good characterization of our PSID data.
(b) Social security. In Section 4.3 we attributed excessive consumption inequality
to either the statistical process for earnings uncertainty | which we subse-
quently examined | or the variety of risk sharing technologies from which our
economy abstracts. In regard to the latter, we have analyzed versions of our
model which incorporate a pay-as-you go social security system similar to that
in Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (1999b). As one would expect, the inclusion
of a socially provided risk sharing technology reduces consumption inequality
relative to our benchmark economy, thus providing a better account of U.S. da-
ta. The magnitude, however, is not large. In contrast, social security generates
relatively more concavity in the consumption prole | it reduces inequality
among the elderly | and thus oers a relatively inferior account of the linear
shape of the U.S. prole. Deaton, Gourinchas, and Paxson (2000) provide an
more in-depth analysis of how social security and consumption inequality inter-
act. They nd that social security reduces inequality, as do we, and go on to
examine the impact of reforms such as individual accounts.
(c) Borrowing constraints. In economies with unit-root shocks the borrowing con-
straint a is never binding, irrespective of the level at which we set a. Our
benchmark results are therefore independent of issues related to borrowing con-
straints. For economies with decreasingly less persistence, borrowing constraints
8
The fact that consumption dispersion is higher with  = 0:984 than with  = 1:0 is, interestingly,
due to the average increase in consumption dispersion over the lifetime being hump-shaped in , with
the peak occurring somewhere between 0.90 and unity. This property is also a feature of the version
of the PIH discussed in Section 4.2, something we have veried analytically.
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bind more frequently and generate a hump in the consumption dispersion pro-
le. This is evident in Figure 5. For values of  in the range of our estimates,
however, we nd that our results are quite robust to alternative specications
of the borrowing constraint.
(d) Risk aversion. By increasing the risk aversion coeÆcient  to as much as 7,
and simultaneously reducing the value of the utility discount factor  to match
the U.S. capital to output ratio, we nd that the implications for consumption
dispersion are inconsequential. Our results are therefore not sensitive to changes
in risk aversion, per se. Of course, were we to hold time preference xed while
increasing , the level of precautionary savings would increase, the economy's
capital to output ratio would become unrealistically high, the amount of risk
sharing would increase, and the level of consumption inequality would decrease.
(e) Initial wealth. We use evidence on the distribution of wealth among young
U.S. workers documented by Daz-Gimenez, Quadrini, and Ros-Rull (1997).
Economies with an average level of initial wealth (at age 23) of zero, but with
dispersion equal to what is observed in U.S. data, generate consumption in-
equality which is qualitatively similar to our benchmark economy. Consump-
tion dispersion is slightly higher for agents aged 23-29, but slightly lower for the
remaining age cohorts. The magnitude of these dierences is not large and the
average level of dispersion is quite similar to our benchmark model.
(f) Initial distribution of idiosyncratic shocks. Our econometric methodology and
theoretical calculations all assume that there is no initial distribution of per-
sistent idiosyncratic shocks: z
i0
= 0. In terms of earnings, it is conceivable
that the variance of a mean zero distribution for these shocks can identied.
Given our PSID sample, however, we nd doing so problematic (i.e., both the
variance of the xed-eects and the variance of initial distribution of the z's
do not appear to be empirically identiable, something which is primarily due
to the linear shape of the earnings prole in Figure 1). In terms of theory, we
nd the eects on consumption inequality of alternative assumptions about the
distribution of z
i0
to be inconsequential.
(g) Annuities. Our model incorporates perfect annuity markets via the term in
the budget constraint (8) which reects the survivor's premium. We nd that
the elimination of annuities, again holding xed the level of wealth, makes the
consumption prole slightly less concave than our benchmark economy. The size
of this eect, however, is quite small and bridges very little of the gap between
the concavity in our theory and the linearity in data.
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6 Conclusions
This paper studies risk-sharing behavior. An inescapable aspect of risk which arises
in the labor market is age. Young people face more risk than old people, especially
if shocks are persistent. If risk sharing is imperfect, therefore, variation across age
should be informative, both for the degree of risk sharing and the technology which
gives rise to it. We nd that a relatively simple buer-stock savings model provides
a good account of how the age-dependent cross-sectional variance of U.S. income and
consumption are related.
Our results depend less on risk sharing technologies | i.e., number of assets,
annuities markets, social security | than they do on the characteristics of idiosyn-
cratic risk. Most important is the degree of persistence, something which plays a
prominent role in many other studies in macroeconomics and nance. We nd that
very high persistence, in the neighborhood of a unit root, is necessary to account
for how inequality increases with age. Theoretically, this means that models with
low persistence generate far more risk sharing than is indicated by data on income
and consumption inequality. Empirically, it is a result of emphasizing cross-sectional
variances as opposed to the more conventional autocovariances. The former are less
susceptible to measurement error than the latter, something which lends credence to
our estimates. In addition, when both cross-sectional variances and autocovariances
are allowed to weigh-in simultaneously (in the usual GMM sense), the implication of
very high persistence remains.
General equilibrium theory plays an important role in the following sense. What
ultimately determines the degree of risk sharing in a buer-stock model is the amount
of capital available. If preferences can be chosen arbitrarily, any level of capital can
be chosen and any level of risk sharing can be generated. The restriction delivered
by equilibrium is that the level of capital should match that of the U.S. economy:
2.9 times the level of output. Given this, the level of risk sharing (i.e., the level of
consumption inequality relative to income inequality) is endogenous and provides a
useful assessment of the model. We nd our results to be robust to dierent preference
parameters in this sense; alternative combinations of risk aversion and time preference
which lead to a capital output ratio of 2.9 generate similar risk sharing implications.
From a normative perspective, the most important implication of our paper in-
volves the issue highlighted by Keane and Wolpin (1997). They ask a very important
question: what fraction of lifetime uncertainty is resolved before individuals enter
the labor market? They reach an equally important, and provocative, conclusion: 90
percent. This, obviously, has profound implications. It suggests a minimal insurance
role for nancial markets, calls into question most notions of precautionary savings,
and suggests that policy aimed at combating inequality should almost exclusively
focus (at least indirectly) on school children. We reach a less extreme conclusion,
suggesting that at least 40 percent of lifetime uncertainty is resolved over the working
26
years.
9
Relative to Keane and Wolpin (1997), our analysis has its limitations. They use a
dynamic model of occupational choice which can say a great deal about the ultimate
determinants of inequality. Our model is driven by a reduced-form statistical process
for earnings, so inequality is not driven by decisions, per se. This limitation, however,
can also be a strength. Our conclusion rests on one simple observation: without
substantial life-cycle shocks, it is diÆcult to account for the extent to which inequality
in earnings and consumption increases between age 23 and retirement. What makes
this argument particularly convincing is consumption. Should earnings inequality
be driven by forces other than shocks | educational and occupational decisions, for
instance | consumption inequality will tend to be at across age due to the standard
life-cycle smoothing motive (and ignoring liquidity constraints). Labor market risk,
therefore, is necessary to account for increasing consumption inequality with age.
9
Section 4.5 discusses the specics of what distinguishes our approach and what gives rise to this
dierence.
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Appendix A
Panel Data and Estimation
Our data source is the family les and the individual les of the Panel Study on Income
Dynamics (PSID), covering the years 1969-1992. Since each PSID cross section covers
income earned the previous year, we refer to the time dimension as being 1968-1991.
We base our analysis on a sequence of 22 overlapping panels, each of which has a
time dimension of 3 years. For instance, the rst panel, which we refer to as having
a `base year' of 1968, consists of earnings data from the years 1968, 1969, and 1970.
The panel with a base year of 1969 contains data from 1969, 1970 and 1971. These
overlapping panels allow for the identication of our model's time series parameters
while at the same time maintaining a broad cross section (due to the introduction of
new households) and a stable age distribution. In addition, our statistical methods
explicitly incorporate the overlapping nature of the panels into our estimate of the
covariance matrix.
We dene a household's total earnings as wage earnings plus transfers. Wage
earnings are dened as the sum of the wage earnings of the household head plus those
of their spouse. `Transfers' include a long list of variables dened by the PSID (the
1968 variable name, for instance, is V1220), but the lion's share is attributable to
unemployment insurance, workers compensation, and transfers from non-household
family members. Total earnings are converted to real earnings per household member
by using the CPI deator and by dividing by the number of household members.
Given a specic base year, a household is selected into the associated panel if the
following conditions are met for the base year and each of the two subsequent years:
 Total earnings are positive in each year.
 Total earning growth rates are no larger than 20 and no less than 1/20 in any
consecutive years.
In addition, we follow standard practice in excluding households which were originally
included in the Survey of Economic Opportunity. This selection criteria is quite
broad relative to previous work, including our own (Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron
(1999a)). Additional restrictions are typically imposed that the household head is
male and that there is no change in family structure over time. We choose not to
impose these restrictions because (a) we don't need to: our focus on cross-sectional
moments greatly mitigates the problems associated with estimating a dynamic model
with data in which household structure changes, and (b) we don't want to: by doing
so we may eliminate an important component of the idiosyncratic variation we are
trying to measure. In addition, this broad selection criteria is chosen to be consistent
with the consumption data we use, taken from Deaton and Paxson (1994).
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Much of our analysis is based on the age prole of the cross-sectional variance of
the logarithm of earnings: see Figure 1 for instance. These cross-sectional variances
have been computed so as to remove \cohort eects:" variation which is specic
to a cohort of individuals born during the same year. For our graphical analysis,
we use the same method as Deaton and Paxson (1994). We remove cohort and age
means and then regress the residuals on age and cohort dummy variables. The graphs
report the coeÆcients on the age dummies, rescaled so as to match the average level
of dispersion in the raw data. For our GMM analysis, we take a dierent approach,
using the moments underlying the OLS estimates to formulate a lower-dimensional
model of the age eects.
A.1 Reconciliation with Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) Data
Our paper is based on earnings data from the PSID and consumption data from the
CEX, the idea being that these are the best data sources. The cost, of course, is
consistency. While it is not possible to compare consumption across both sources
| the PSID contains only data on food consumption | we can check how labor
earnings measure up. We nd that average income for various age groups in the CEX
is very similar to our PSID sample. For example, the mean income of households in
the 1997 CEX survey is $40,247, $48,788 and $55,260 for ages 30,40,50, respectively.
The corresponding means in the PSID, given our selection criteria, are essentially
identical. More importantly, we nd that, once one uses our relatively broad PSID
selection criteria, cross sectional variances are quite similar across sources. This can
be informally veried by comparing Figure 1 to the associated graphs in Deaton and
Paxson (1994).
A.2 Parametric Model and GMM Estimation
We associate an individual household with the age of the household head, denoted
h, and the cohort (i.e., the birth year) to which the household belongs, denoted c.
There are H ages and C cohorts. The logarithm of demeaned earnings for the ith
household of age h belonging to cohort c is modeled as
y
c
ih
= u
ih
+ x
ic
where x
ic
and u
ih
represent mean zero `cohort' and `age' shocks respectively.
Deaton and Paxson (1994) use a dummy variable regression to recover the vari-
ances of u
ih
and x
ic
, which we denote b
h
and a
c
. They then scale the age eects so
that, on average, the coeÆcients match the unconditional variance of some reference
age group (we use age 42). We denote the scaled age eects as b

h
. The solution to
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the following system of moment equations yields the OLS estimates from this dummy
variable regression:
E[(y
c
ih
)
2
jh]  a  b
h
= 0; H such moments
E[(y
c
ih
)
2
jc]  

b  a
c
= 0 C such moments
b
h
+ (m  b
42
)  b

h
= 0 (A1)
E[(y
c
ih
)
2
jh = 42]  m = 0
The rst two equations are the OLS moments while the second two represent the
scaling.
As discussed in the text, our approach consists of putting structure on u
ih
and,
therefore, on b

h
. Specically, we let
u
ih
= 
i
+ z
ih
+ "
ih
z
ih
= z
i;h 1
+ 
ih
;
where 
i
 N(0; 
2

), "
ih
 N(0; 
2
"
), 
ih
 N(0; 
2

) and z
i0
= 0. This implies that
the age eects have the following form
b

h
= Var(u
ih
) = 
2

+ 
2

h 1
X
j=0

2j
+ 
2
"
: (A2)
Our estimator is based on an amalgamation of equations (A1) and (A2). This
system, however, does not separately identify 
2

and 
2
"
. We therefore formulate
additional moment equations based upon summations of y
c
ih
:
s
c
ih
= y
c
ih
+ y
c
i;h+1
+ y
c
i;h+2
:
Variances of s
c
ih
identify 
2

and 
2
"
because they involve autocovariances. We pre-
fer these variances to individual autocovariances because (a) they incorporate infor-
mation from multiple autocovariances in an economical way (this is helpful for the
exactly-identied system described below), and (b) they are less susceptible to i.i.d.
measurement error.
The variances of s
c
ih
are
Var(s
c
ih
) = 9
2

+ 3
2
"
+

(1 + )
2
+ 1


2

+

1 + + 
2

2
Var (z
ih
) + 9a
c
; (A3)
where Var(z
ih
) = 
2

P
h 1
j=0

2j
. These moments are cohort specic. We eliminate
cohort specicity by scaling the s
c
ih
data as follows:
s
ih
=
s
c
ih
Var(s
c
ih
)
1=2

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2

+ 3
2
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+

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+
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)

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;
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where the term in the denominator, Var(s
c
ih
)
1=2
, is the expression on the right hand
side of equation (A3). The variance of s
ih
is
Var(s
ih
) = 9
2

+ 3
2
"
+

(1 + )
2
+ 1


2

+

1 + + 
2

2
Var(z
ih
) (A4)
which is now absent cohort eects. Equations (A4) therefore represent H 2 moments
which we use in varying degrees in the discussion below. Initially, we treat the a
c
's as
given when constructing the s
ih
's (incorporating, however, the sampling variability
in our standard errors), but subsequently we estimate them jointly with the other
parameters.
The moment equations (A1), (A2) and (A4) form the foundation of our estimators.
An obvious place to begin might be to substitute equations (A2) into equations (A1)
and then add K equations of the form (A4). This would give an overidentied system
with H+C+K equations and C+4 parameters. As is discussed in the text, however,
we nd it informative to begin with a much smaller, exactly-identied, system and
then work our way up to the larger system.
Panel B of Table 1
These estimates represent an exactly identied system. Taking as given the estimates
of the a
c
's from (A1), we choose three ages from equations (A1) | ages 23, 42 and 60
| and one age from equations (A4): age 42. The estimates of , 

, 

, and 

are
simply a solution to the non-linear set of equations which result from equating the
three b

h
parameters to the corresponding expressions from equations ((A2) and then
incorporating the one equation from (A4). The standard errors are corrected for the
estimation error embedded in the estimates of b

h
and a
c
and are computed using the
delta method.
We repeated this estimation procedure for moments based on dierent age-sets.
That is, we maintained h = 42 for equation (A4) while using h = 30; 45; 60 and
h = 35; 45; 55 in equation (A2). The results were essentially unaltered. We also tried
h = 30, 40 and 50 in equation (A4). Again, the results were very similar to those
displayed in Table 1.
Panel C of Table 1
Panel C moves to an overidentied GMM system by incorporating all ages from
equations (A4). That is, we incorporate information from many more age-dependent
autocovariances. We continue to use only ages h = 23; 42; 60 from equations (A2). As
discussed in the text, the additional autocovariance moments reduce the estimated ,
but only marginally. This result is robust to changing the age set used in equation
(A2).
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Panel D of Table 1
Panels A through C treat the a
c
parameters as xed. In panel D, we jointly estimate
the a
c
's in both (A1) and (A3-A4). The procedure is in essence similar to the one used
for Panels B and C except that the a
c
's are iterated upon jointly with ; 

; 

; 

using
equations (A1)-(A4). The starting values are the a
c
values of the OLS estimation in
Panel B. The cohort eects a
c
do not change dramatically but do result in a slightly
lower estimate of .
Additional Evidence
1. Estimates using moments based directly on individual autocovariances instead
of the summation moments (A4) | perhaps a more conventional approach |
yield slightly lower estimates of , between 0.95 and 0.97.
2. Year, age and cohort dummies cannot be simultaneously estimated as they are
linear combinations of one another. To check whether our results are sensitive
to the use of cohort dummies, we estimated the age eects in conjunction with
year dummies instead of cohort dummies. The pattern in the cross-sectional
variances depicted in Figure 1 is quite robust along these lines (Deaton and
Paxson (1994) reach a similar conclusion).
3. We estimated the earnings process separately for dierent educational groups:
no high school diploma, high school graduates, and college graduates. The
estimates for all these education groups are quite similar to those presented in
Table 1. For example, for high school graduates we estimated  to be 0.974
and 0.968 when cohort eects were set at their OLS estimates and were jointly
estimated, respectively. Our estimates of persistence using pooled data (across
educational groups) are therefore robust in this sense. Similar ndings apply to
the other parameters.
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Appendix B
Welfare Calculations
Details regarding the welfare gain of removing xed eects are as follows. We want
to answer the question \how much consumption is the agent willing to give up to get
rid of the xed eects?" We claim that this amount is  

= 1  exp
 
 
2


.
To see this, start with the following expression which implicitly denes  

:
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Since preferences are homothetic and xed eects simply scale earnings and borrow-
ing constraints proportionally in each state, each individual's consumption must be
proportional to their xed eect. Thus, c
h
(; z; "; a) = c
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
, so (B5) can
be rewritten as
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QED
Now, let us compute the welfare gain of removing life-cycle shocks, i.e. to obtain
an answer the question \how much consumption is the agent willing to give up to get
rid of the life-cycle shocks?" This amounts to solving for  
l
implicitly given by
Z Z Z
V
1
(; z; "; 0)  (; z; ") ddzd" = (1   
l
)
1 
Z
^
V
1
(; 0) d
where
^
V
1
(; 0) is the value function of a newborn agent in who has xed-eect  and
zero wealth in an economy with 

= 
"
= 0. The term (1   
l
) is raised to the
power 1   and premultiplying the value function since the current utility is CRRA
(see above). This means that the welfare gain  
l
can be expressed by the following
expression (which must be computed numerically by simulation)
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Table 1
Idiosyncratic Endowment Process: Parameter Estimates
 
2


2


2
"
A. Informal Estimates, Based on Figure 2

Estimate 0.9989 0.2735 0.0166 n.a.
Standard Error
B. Exactly Identied System
Estimate 0.984 0.242 0.022 0.057
Standard Error 0.009 0.016 0.007 0.028
C. Overidentied System, Predetermined Cohort Eects
Estimate 0.982 0.247 0.024 0.061
Standard Error 0.011 0.013 0.006 0.022
D. Overidentied System, Simultaneously Estimated Cohort Eects
Estimate 0.977 0.244 0.024 0.063
Standard Error 0.018 0.021 0.010 0.029

The parameters 

and 
"
are not separately identied in this case.
Entries describe GMM estimates for the idiosyncratic endowment process described in the
text:
u
ih
= 
i
+ z
ih
+ "
ih
z
ih
= z
i;h 1
+ 
ih
;
where 
i
 N(0; 
2

), "
ih
 N(0; 
2
"
), 
ih
 N(0; 
2

) and z
0
ic
= 0. Estimates in Panel A are
based on the level, slope and curvature of the age prole of cross-sectional variances shown
in Figure 1. In Panel B, one additional moment is added vis-a-vis those implicit in Panel A:
the variance of the sum, u
ih
+ u
i;h+1
+ u
i;h+2
. The estimates are based on one specic age,
h = 42, but alternatives are discussed in Appendix A. Panel C represents the same approach
as Panel B, however one moment is added for each age cohort. In Panel D we estimate `cohort
eects' simultaneously with the four parameters of interest, whereas in Panels A{C cohort
eects are pre-estimated and removed from our data through cohort-specic scaling.
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Figure 1
Cross-sectional Variance by Age
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Each line represents the age-dependent, cross-sectional variance of the logarithm of the quan-
tity in question. The basic data unit is the household. Consumption data are from the Con-
sumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) and are taken directly from Deaton and Paxson (1994).
Earnings data are taken from the Panel Study on Income Dynamics (PSID). Exact details are
in Appendix A. The lower panel reports earnings dispersion broken down into three educa-
tional cohorts whereas the upper panel aggregates educational cohorts. All graphs represent
variances which are net of `cohort eects:' dispersion which is unique to a group of households
with heads born in the same year. This is accomplished, as in Deaton and Paxson (1994),
via a cohort and age dummy variable regression. The graphs are the coeÆcients on the age
dummies, scaled so as to mimic the overall level of dispersion in the data.
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Figure 2
Calibration of Earnings Process
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The solid line is the cross-sectional variance of earnings, based upon PSID data, and is taken
directly from Figure 1. The dashed line represents the population cross-sectional variances
associated with the process formulated in Section 2.1, with parameter values chosen to best
match the level (i.e., the intercept), the slope and the curvature of the empirical age prole.
The resulting parameter values (discussed in Section 2.1) are 
2

+ 
2
"
= 0:2735, 
2

= 0:0166
and  = 0:9989. The asterisks represent the three sample variances which this informal
calibration explicitly matches.
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Figure 3
Cross-sectional Variance: Theory and Data
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This graph compares the population moments from our benchmark model with those of the
data. Solid lines represent theoretical and empirical earnings. Dashed lines represent con-
sumption. The dotted line represents the cross-sectional variance of consumption generated
by the life-cycle version of the permanent income hypothesis, discussed in Section 4.2.
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Figure 4
Eect of Shape of Earnings Prole on Shape of Consumption Prole
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This graph supports the rst statement in Section 4.3; a realistically-shaped prole of earn-
ings inequality is neither necessary nor suÆcient to generate a realistically shaped prole of
consumption inequality. Solid lines represent sample moments. The dotted lines show that
an unrealistic pattern of earnings dispersion (the uppermost dotted line) can be associated
with a realistic pattern of consumption dispersion (the lower dotted line). The dashed lines
show the opposite, that a realistic pattern of earnings dispersion (the uppermost dashed line)
can generate a counterfactual pattern of consumption dispersion (the lower dashed line). The
critical ingredient is persistence. The dotted lines are associated with a high-persistence earn-
ings process, but with an initial distribution equal to the stationary distribution. The dashed
lines represent an i.i.d. earnings processes, but with volatility which increases with age.
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Figure 5
Eect of Persistence on Consumption Inequality
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U.S. Consumption
This graph provides examples which substantiate point B of section 4.3: highly autocorrelated
shocks are necessary to account for the increase in U.S. consumption dispersion. The solid
line represents sample moments and the others are from economies with varying degrees of
persistence. In order to focus on the increase, the loci are all indexed to unity at age 23. Each
line represents the answer to the question, \what is the maximum increase in consumption
dispersion that can be generated by shocks of a given level of persistence?" In order to
generate the maximum, we set the xed-eect shocks and the transitory shocks to zero. The
conditional variance of the persistent shocks is then chosen to match the average level of
earnings dispersion in the data (i.e., the average of the solid line in Figure 3).
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Figure 6
Eect of Persistence in Conjunction with Heteroskedastic Shocks
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The dashed line represents sample moments on consumption dispersion. Each of the dotted
lines represent consumption dispersion from a theoretical economy with persistence as noted
in the graph, and with age-dependent heteroskedasticity in the conditional variance chosen
so that earnings inequality matches the solid line (which also matches that in our benchmark
economy). All the economies, therefore, have an identical pattern of earnings inequality,
but dierent patterns in consumption inequality. The economy with  = 0:85 most closely
matches the data. The heteroskedastic pattern which gives rise to this features older workers
experiencing idiosyncratic shocks which are more volatile than those faced by younger workers.
See Section 4.4 for a discussion.
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Figure 7
Eect of Lower Persistence
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This graph mimics Figure 3, but represents shocks with an autocorrelation of 0.984, chosen
to be representative of the estimates in Table 1. See point (a), Section 5 for a discussion.
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